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Assessment techniques, certification and!
 [what else we need for]  
confidence in software !
Lorenzo Strigini!
Centre for Software Reliability 
City University London, U.K.!
!
!
2!Lorenzo Strigini. City University London. WoSoCer 2014, Naples!
Outline!
Topic: assessment, certification, regulations and standards 
for all this!
•  their effects: desired, desirable, likely, undesired: 
what can certification be about and what does it prove?!
•  a couple of ways that certification of critical software may 
give quantifiable confidence!
•  various disclaimers!
–  a view from a non-certifier, observing practice and claims 
 for close to 30 years!
–  skewed towards safety, and very stringent requirements!
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Certification and its roles!
–  “certify”, from Latin, “to make certain”!
–  in common use, attestation by someone trustworthy that a certain 
statement is true to the best of his (expert!) knowledge !
–  e.g. a medical certificate!
•  for software, a range of stated meanings, e.g.!
–  “to perform a set of checks on reusable components in order to 
guarantee that they are error-free (or at least without major error) 
and that their reuse will not lead to problems..” [Coulange 1998]!
–  “planned and systematic set of activities that ensure that software 
life cycle processes and products conform to requirements, 
standards, and procedures.” [IEEE 1992]!
–  “process for demonstrating that system safety is satisfactory for 
flight operation” [NASA] !
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There is a consensus (?) that confidence that 
can be had from certification is limited!
!
“Certification is not a proof of correctness. Accepted tests 
and reviews, as well as widespread usage are factors 
contributing to an increased confidence that the software 
has been subjected to a qualified development”  
Swedish Armed Forces (2005) M7762-000621-7 
handbook for software in safety-critical applications, cited 
[Kornecki & Zalewski 2009]!
!
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Continuing discontent,  and good news!
•  various criticism:!
–  too much emphasis on process, too little on product!
–  lack of evidence that the prescribed practices achieve the 
intended results (or even have a bearing on them)!
–  negative effects!
+  prescriptive regimes may encourage box-ticking mind set, 
complacency!
+  “safety cases may suffer from ad-hocness, confirmation bias”!
•  all this doubt is good: it has driven adoption and/or 
improvement of useful techniques, e.g.!
–  proof!
+  e.g. model checking tools suitable for industrial use!
–  fault injection!
+  e.g. progress in injecting faults that are realistic!
–  extensive study of arguments and cases!
+  seeking ways to make sense of complex evidence to understand/
communicate the strength of support for the claims made!
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Certification may achieve...!
•  certainty or high probability that certain activities, seen as 
“due diligence”, have been applied [properly/competently]!
•  “independent“ confirmation that certain checks performed 
yield certain encouraging results!
•  desired: strong, justified confidence that the software will 
satisfy certain requirements!
–  including pretty extreme ones, in the “ultra-high reliability” class!
–  e.g. (aviation): for catastrophic failures, “failure must be unlikely to 
happen over the lifetime of a type” 
(the “10-9“ requirement)!
– many reasons for believing current practices do not support this!
–  yet, there are cases of apparent success, e.g. civil  aviation!
+  few software-related incident and accidents!
+  but sources of doubt... e.g. some evidence that stricter practice does 
not get better results!
+  is “success” really causation or just correlation?!
both certification practice and high safety caused by this being a 
“g od” industry (safety politically important, well funded)!
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Certification practices may be harmful ...!
•  shifting of responsibility (legal or psychological)!
–  to certifier or to prescriptive standard!
+  effect akin to using safety interlock for normal operation!
+  e.g. novel application/technology: eager certifiers may apply old 
existing standards, adopters feel safe that they use certified 
components!
•  consensus on “the best now known, feasible practice”!
– may become standard of “all that is needed”!
– may de-incentivise inventing something better!
•  degradation of culture: aim for certification, not safety!
•  ritualization: “accepted” assumptions, need for 
reproducibility may trump criticism, true challenge to 
claims!
!
a good read:  When the Chick Hits the Fan - Representativeness and 
Reproducibility in Technological Tests by John Downer!
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What else? (or: the baby vs the bath water)!
•  even though certification practices may fail at ensuring 
that products satisfy stated requirements!
•  it may achieve other desirable results:!
– more adequate products than if these practices were not applied!
–  better functioning of markets?!
–  barriers to entry against incompetent vendors!
–  avoiding use of definitely inadequate products!
–  cultural effect: promote safety/quality/security focus!
–  policing effect (e.g. vendor management cannot cut assurance 
activities if they are part of dominant certification practice)!
–  giving something in return for applying “good” practice, even if 
real returns on safety/dependability/ ... are unknown!
•  different “purposes” (societal goods) -> different requirements 
on certification practices!
•  improvements to practice should avoid disrupting good effects !
An interesting workshop: AESSCS 2014: Planning the Unplanned Experiment: 
Assessing the Efficacy of Standards for Safety Critical Software, April 2014!
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Back to the “main” goal!
•  proving that the software can be used without undue 
danger!
–  (for safety certification: otherwise without undue downtime, undue 
costs... etc.)!
–  e.g. that failures of a certain class of severity are less likely than 
10-x to happen (e.g. per mission, per demand, per hour, per 
deployed item, ..)!
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What can be certified!
•  process applied: especially conformance to 
recommendations/prescriptions by standards!
+  for that category of product!
+  for that criticality of function!
•  results of applying checks to this product!
–  esp. those recommended by standards [...]!
•  behaviour observed!
–  in real or simulated (operational testing)  operation!
–  the only direct evidence that software will behave acceptably!
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Current practice suffers from inconsistency!
•  privileging indirect evidence !
–  e.g., process quality , logs of V&V activities!
!
•  ... mismatched to quantitative claims like low probability 
of dangerous failure!
–  the evidence is about methods applied for having fewer faults!
– methods which are not known to seek out faults with high 
probability of failure occurrence!
–  reducing number of faults may NOT greatly reduce probability of 
failure!!
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What indirect evidence really proves!
•  it (probably!) increases the probability that the product is 
satisfactorily dependable (e.g. <10-x probability of 
dangerous failures)!
•  then improved further by operation / operational test (with 
actual future profile of use), through Bayesian inference!
prior probability density !
            function: from indirect 
! ! !evidence!
posterior  probability 
  density  
   function!
change with evidence 
of successful operation!
!
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Aleatory vs epistemic uncertainty!
aleatory uncertainty:!
•  given this product and this environment of use, we cannot 
say when one of the failures of interest will happen!
•  due to “inherent randomness in the world”: 
unpredictability of when those specific rare circumstances 
will occur that cause those failures!
•   although there is a probability of their occurring!
epistemic uncertainty:!
•  we don't know this probability: it might be 10-6, 10-5, 
0.00034.... !
•  each with different probability!
•  perhaps unlikely to be > 0.1, more likely <10-4...!
•  so it is a random variable with a  probability distribution!
•  the more evidence, the more we can reduce the uncertainty !
....  what certification is about!!
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Two ways that current practices may “work”!
.. towards high confidence in required software 
dependability!
1.  given effective enough development/ V&V practices,  
the product has a reasonable probability of having 
probability of dangerous failure as low as required!
–  and in particular, being free from dangerous defects!
+  thus operational testing and operation build up confidence that either 
it is so or, if not, it does not have very high probability of failure!
2.  given strong run-time mitigation measures, monitoring 
and safety management,  
any dangerous defect has a chance of revealing itself 
and being rectified before any accident occurs!
!
both forms of reasoning considered reasonable by some vendors/
regulators... for formal mathematical structure, see e.g. the two papers 
by Povyakalo and Strigini, and by Bishop in SAFECOMP 2013!
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Is absence of faults plausible?!
in many cases, yes!
•  limited to faults that are safety-relevant!
•  given simplicity of systems and of safety requirements!
•  strong verification (including proof) can exclude certain 
defects, almost with certainty!
•  indeed, most evidence now used is only pertinent to 
probabilistic claim when claiming absence of defects! !
–  obviously with some residual doubt (confidence <100%)!
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Is absence of faults demonstrable?!
•  indeed, most indirect evidence now used is only pertinent 
to probabilistic claim when claiming absence of defects! !
–  obviously with some residual doubt (confidence <100%)!
•  how to claim a certain level of confidence?!
•  needs empirical basis. E.g., if !
– we know that 9 out of 10 systems developed in similar conditions 
turned out to be faults-free in use !
–  or have studied the effectiveness of the assurance methods 
applied over many applications!
•  ... we can estimate a probability that the current system is 
defect-free, e.g.!
        P(faults in product | passing verification)=!
                            P(faults)P(passing | faults)                        . 
P(faults)P(passing | faults)+P(no faults)P(passing | no faults)!
repeating for additional assurance steps!
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Using “probability of absence of faults”!
•  a special case of “the requirement that failures are less 
likely than 10-x is satisfied”!
–  for which evidence is given by the fault avoidance and fault 
detection/removal practices used!
–  and with nice properties: 0 probability of any failure under any 
kind of usage!
•  of course even if I were 99% certain of no dangerous 
faults!
–  I’d want some assurance that if my system is one of the unlucky 
1% it des not fail too often!!




this reasoning requires not just fault avoidance/removal practices 
(standard for critical systems) but evidence of their effectiveness !
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Using “probability of absence of faults”!
•  a difficulty is the need for a prior distribution for pfd or 
failure rate if defects are present!
•  too little evidence now known about effects of 
development/assurance practices!
•  we showed there is a worst case prior, guaranteeing 
pessimistic errors on probability of future failure!
•  sufficient in certain scenarios!
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Example  of application!
!
20!Lorenzo Strigini. City University London. WoSoCer 2014, Naples!
Using “probability that faults will be corrected 
before accidents”!
•  accept that faults will be present despite software 
assurance and certification!
•  consider defence-in-depth in system design!
•  implying that many “dangerous” faults of the software!
– will not cause accident at the first failure[s] (if any) that they cause!
– will be found, corrected and never cause accidents!
•  thus a system !
–  is objectively more dangerous at start of use than later!
–  but low lifetime risk is achieved!
this reasoning requires not just detection/mitigation mechanisms 
(standard in critical systems) but evidence of their effectiveness !
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So, what more may certification practice 
need?!
•  ... to directly give confidence in quantitative claim of safe 
[or secure or reliable or ...] operation!
!
•  ... using these [examples of] reasoning approaches would 
require !
–  documentation of effectiveness of assurance practices!
+  of whole processes!
+  of individual practices!
     and of diversity among them!
–  documentation of effectiveness of run-time mitigation and 
reporting!
+  coverage of defence-in-depth mechanisms !
+  and of error detection, reporting practices!
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Notes: diversity of fault avoidance/removal!
•  with increasing criticality of function, we demand more 
stringent assurance practices and more of them!
•  with what cumulative effects? Only knowable from 
experience!
•  e.g., suppose I apply two defect-finding techniques!
–  suppose documented effectiveness: one detects existing 
problems 60% of times, one 50% of times!
–  together they might detect problems somewhere between !
+  100% of times - they are complementary!
+  and 60% of times – their coverages overlap  
 
(provided that the knowledge of having both has not reduced the care 
in application)!
•  note:  this learning is important not only for confidence, 
but for effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of practices!
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Detection and reporting of in-operation events!
•  emphasis on operation-time detection/monitoring, logging 
of errors/failures/ near misses!
•  conventional wisdom for achieving safety!
–  at organisation level, related to resilience, safety culture!
–  at technical level, covered (more or less strongly) by standards!
•  also crucial for arguing that any faults will not undermine 
safety requirements!
•  evidence of effectiveness is essential!
–  but more difficult to collect  than evidence of failure-free behaviour 
of the subsystem they protect!
– mechanisms rarely invoked!
–  subsystem failures are rarer than operation, their profile less 
predictable!
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Notes: System vs components!
(more important distinction than “software vs hardware”)!
•  the more minute a part of a system we consider!
   the greater the role for simply showing it “correct”!
•  the more we climb towards considering the whole system, 
the more it matters !
– whether the spec was correct (any system design faults?)!
– what mitigation measures exist in the rest of the system and how 
well they address the failure modes of the components and 
system!
– more difficult to assess!
+  normal use, operational test will rarely test mitigation measures!
–  hence importance of fault injection!
  and of its limitations:  it can document coverage factor against!
+  known faults in this system!
+  realistically common faults of this class of products!
+  but: unknown faults in this system??!
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Conclusions?!
•  software certification practices as they are bring many 
likely benefits!
–  improved by ongoing technical advances!
+  together with some possible harm!
•  but not generally the main desired benefit: clearly justified 
confidence in a (quantitative) level of dependability!
•  improving their potential requires!
–  explicit, mathematical statement of the reasoning through which 
the claim is argued to be satisfied!
I have given two examples!
*  using probability of “perfection” plus operational testing/use!
*  using effectiveness of defence-in-depth plus fixes!
–  collection of quantitative evidence as input to this reasoning!
•  these requirements are not technically disruptive!
–  they support/extend practices already recognised as desirable!
•  though they may incur political/economic difficulties!
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Thank you for listening! 
!
!
!
!
!
Any comments, questions?!
!
!
